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Abstract 
This paper analyzes factors that shape the technological capabilities of individual U.S. states and 
European  countries,  which  are  arguably  comparable  policy  units.  The  analysis  demonstrates 
convergence in technological capabilities from 2000 to 2007. The results indicate that social 
capabilities,  such  as  a  highly  educated  labor  force,  an  egalitarian  distribution  of  income,  a 
participatory democracy and prevalence of public safety, condition the growth of technological 
capability. The analysis also considers other aspects of territorial dynamics, such as the possible 
effects  of  spatial  agglomeration,  urbanization  economies,  and  differences  in  industrial 
specialization and knowledge spillovers from neighboring regions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
When trying to explain, and possibly influence, long run economic growth, attention has 
increasingly turned to the social, institutional and economic factors that affect technology and 
productivity  growth.  Examples  include  Porter’s  four-factor  diamond  model  in  his  The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990); the literature on national and regional “systems of 
innovation”  (Lundvall  1992,  Nelson  1993,  Braczyk  et  al.  1998);  and  notions  such  as  social 
capital (Putnam 1993) or social filter (Crescenzi et al. 2007).  The policy implication is that to 
successfully  generate  adequate  technological  capabilities  and  exploit  these  economically,  a 
number of supporting social, institutional and economic factors need to be in place.  
In  contrast  to  this  broad  perspective  on  what  matters  for  growth,  the  so-called  “new 
growth theory” (Romer 1990, Aghion and Howitt 1992) attributes cross-country differences in 
income and productivity to a single factor only—the ability to devote resources to research and 
development (R&D). The message that increasing R&D was the right direction for policy was 
received with enthusiasm by governments in Europe, who in the so-called ‘Lisbon Strategy’—
adopted by EU around the turn of the millennium—stated that R&D investment should increase 
to three percent of GDP within a decade, up from the prevailing rate of less than two percent,  
with  the  purpose  of  making  Europe  "the  most  competitive  and  dynamic  knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion.”
1 The adoption of this goal was influenced by the observation that the 
United States, commonly seen as Europe’s main global competitor, had a share of R&D to GDP 
far above the European level.  In the United States,  conversely, fears of falling behind  have 
created a call for policies to subsidize private sector investments in R&D and for increased 
government R&D spending. 
In our view, an important shortcoming of the prevailing analysis underlying the Lisbon 
Strategy and other policy discussions is a far too narrow focus on what shapes technological 
dynamics. The sole focus on R&D, while perhaps consistent with new growth theory, overlooks 
that  R&D—while  important—is  only  one  among  several  factors  influencing  technological 
competitiveness (Fagerberg et al. 2004). Not all innovation results from or requires R&D, and a 
                                                 
1Lisbon  European  Council  23-24.03.2000:  Conclusions  of  the  Presidency 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm)   2 
high level of R&D spending does not translate directly to innovation. To succeed in innovation, 
supporting  resources  and  institutions  are  necessary,  extending  beyond  the  single  firm  to  the 
wider environment in which the firm is embedded (Feldman and Kogler 2010). A proper analysis 
of  technological  growth  therefore  requires  a  perspective  that  takes  these  wider  aspects  into 
account.  
Another  problem  is  that  much  of  the  prevailing  analyses  are  based  on  comparisons 
between variable means for very large and heterogeneous geographical entities. Hence, the great 
variation within Europe and the US tends to be overlooked, and this has implications for the 
analysis of the technological dynamics of the two continents (Crescenzi et al. 2007). Sweden, for 
example, invests nearly four percent of its GDP in R&D, which is about the same as California 
or Massachusetts. However, this investment is almost ten times that of several EU countries, 
such  as  Greece,  Slovakia  or  Romania,  or  U.S.  states,  such  as  Wyoming  or  South  Dakota. 
Moreover, the finding that some parts of Europe compare well with the most advanced regions of 
the US also holds when considering other social and economic data (King 2004).  Thus, it seems 
pertinent  to  take  such  spatial  heterogeneity  into  account  when  analyzing  the  technological 
dynamics of, say, Europe and the US and advocating for policy interventions. Responding to this 
need, this paper analyzes technological dynamics in the two continents using the same indicators 
for  European  countries  and  US  states.    Arguably,  states  are  more  comparable  to  European 
countries than the US as whole due to the heterogeneity within the U.S.   
The only prior attempt to tackle this issue, by Crescenzi et al. (2007), compares US cities 
to EU regions for the period of 1990-2002.  To measure the outcome of the territorial dynamics 
of innovation, they use patent counts as their dependent variable. However, patents do not really 
measure innovation.  Patenting is much more widely used in some technological fields (e.g., 
chemicals, biotechnology) than in others (Smith 2004). Many inventions protected by patents 
never make it to the market, while many, if not most, innovations introduced to the market are 
not  patented.  Thus,  although  patents  provide  useful  information  on  certain  aspects  of 
technological activity, this paper applies a broader perspective. Moreover, while Crescenzi et al. 
(2007) find that there are important differences in the technological and territorial dynamics 
between the two continents, their conclusions are based on separate analyses that do not always 
employ the same or comparable variables.   Arguably, robust conclusions about the difference in   3 
technological dynamics require a common framework for comparison—i.e., the same model and 
variables.  
The next section outlines a synthetic framework for analyzing technological dynamics 
that  takes  into  account  key  insights  from  innovation  theory  (Kline  and  Rosenberg  1986, 
Fagerberg et al. 2004), development studies (Adelman and Morris 1965, Kim 1980, 1997, Lall 
1992), economic history (Abramowitz 1986), and economic geography (Feldman and Kogler 
2010). The literature suggests a broader notion of technological capability as the central variable 
and the inclusion of a set of social capabilities as conditioning variables for the development of 
technological capability. The analysis also takes into account territorial dynamics, such as the 
possible  effects  of  spatial  agglomeration,  urbanization  economies,  differences  in  industrial 
specialization, and knowledge spillovers from neighboring regions. Section 3 presents the 75 
geographical entities (48 states in the continental US and 27 countries in Europe) that form the 
basis of the paper and considers how capabilities may be measured empirically.  Factor analysis 
is used to give a concise representation of how technological and social capabilities differ across 
US  states  and  European  countries.    In  section  4  we  present  the  results  of  our  econometric 
estimation and compare the conclusions reached in this paper with those of previous research. 
Finally, section 5 concludes with a focus on what can be learned about what shapes technological 
dynamics in the US and Europe and what the policy implications may be.  
 
2. Technological dynamics: A synthetic framework 
 
Technology may be defined as knowledge about how to produce goods and services. 
Most people today would probably accept the view that technology and economic performance 
are intimately related. However, from the classical political economists onwards, the field of 
economics  has  viewed growth and development  as  mainly arising from  the accumulation of 
capital  (through  the  introduction  of  new  machinery).  The  tendency  to  reduce  technology  to 
machinery, or knowledge to artifacts, was widespread.  Even a highly heterodox economist  such 
as Veblen (1915) —who was the first to analyze technological catch-up processes in the world 
economy—argued along these lines.   According to Veblen, in contrast to conditions that had 
prevailed previously,  the     “machine technology”   “can be held  and transmitted … and the   4 
acquisition of it by such transfer is no laborious or uncertain matter” (ibid 191). In short, because 
of the easy transfer of technology, catch-up should be expected to be easy.  
Most neoclassical economists in the early post-war period shared this optimistic mood, 
and expected that technology diffusion would lead to widespread economic growth. According 
to Robert Solow, the most famous contributor to the development of the neoclassical theory of 
economic  growth,  technology—or  knowledge—should  be  regarded  as  a  public  good  freely 
available to anybody with a desire to share it, independent of his or her background or location 
(Solow 1956). It follows that technology should be expected to benefit everybody to the same 
extent—an  assumption  adopted  in  subsequent  applied  research  based  on  the  neoclassical 
perspective. For example, Denison, the leading researcher of cross country economic growth 
differences in the early post war period, put it as follows: "Because knowledge is an international 
commodity, I should expect the contribution of advances of knowledge (...) to be of about the 
same size in all the countries..." (Denison 1967, p. 282). 
As is well known, these optimistic predictions were not confirmed by historical evidence. 
In fact, the disparities in development in the global economy are far greater today than before the 
industrial revolution (Landes 1998). Thus, the potential for diffusion to catch up across borders 
appears to be difficult. This was also the conclusion that Denison arrived at after consulting the 
evidence: “On the surface, to reduce the gap greatly would not seem very difficult … In contrast 
… the historical record … suggests that either the desire is lacking or imitation is a very difficult 
thing.”  (Denison  1967,  p.  340).  Such  findings  have  been  confirmed  by  subsequent  research 
(Fagerberg1994, Fagerberg and Srholec 2005).  
This points to the need for a more realistic understanding of the factors that condition 
knowledge  creation  and  affect  its  diffusion  in  space  than  has  characterized  theoretical  and 
applied work in economics. A worldwide stock of homogenous knowledge, capable of flowing 
across the globe at the speed of light and being exploited by anyone as much as he or she likes, 
does not exist. Rather, there are many different types of knowledge and knowledge holders. In 
fact, already Nobel laureate Friedrich von Hayek (1945) pointed out that it is impossible for any 
actor, being a person or a firm (or a government for that matter), to know have the “perfect 
knowledge” relevant for the solution of an economic problem. Just to identify what the relevant 
areas  of  knowledge  are  may  in  fact  be  quite  challenging.  Moreover,  as  Hayek  repeatedly 
stressed, not all knowledge is scientific.  Much of knowledge is practical, personal and context-  5 
specific  (Polanyi  1958,  1966).    To  successfully  access  and  gainfully  use  such  knowledge, 
intimate  familiarity  with  its  context  may  be  required.    This  is  one  important  reason  why 
geographic proximity may be important for realizing the benefits of knowledge flows (Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg and Henderson 1993; Audretsch and Feldman 1996).  
Even in cases where relevant knowledge is identifiable, codified and easily accessible, 
there is no guarantee that it will be successfully transferred. Knowledge may, for example, be 
difficult to understand and absorb.  Higher education at the doctorate level may be required to 
gain  the  capabilities  needed  to  understand,  absorb  and  exploit  detailed  scientific  knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Building such capabilities may be demanding, costly and time-
consuming, for an individual, firm or society.  In addition, innovative firms cannot rely on only 
one type of knowledge. They need to be able to access, absorb, combine and use many different 
types, related to, for example, finance, logistics, products, markets, and production.  Access to 
necessary resources, such as Information and Communication Technologies, means of transport 
and skilled labor, and knowledge about how to maintain and exploit these resources, is also 
crucial.  It is of little help to be aware of some promising knowledge if you lack the resources 
necessary to reap benefits from its exploitation.   
A commonly used term for the ability of a firm to acquire, hold and utilize knowledge is 
“technological  capability”—coined by the Korean development  economist  Linsu  Kim  (1980, 
1997), who defined it as “the ability to make effective use of technological knowledge in efforts 
to assimilate, use, adapt and change existing technologies, …. to create new technologies and to 
develop  new  products  and  processes  …”  (Kim  1997,  p.  4).  Using  the  example  of  Korean 
electronics firms, Kim further distinguished between different layers of technological capability 
depending  of  the  complexity  of  the  challenge.  He  identified  production  capability,  which  is 
required to operate production efficiently; investment capability, required to enter into lines of 
business new to the firm (though not necessarily to the world); and finally, innovation capability, 
which is needed if the firm wishes to change or develop entirely new products or processes. Kim 
expected the requirements with respect to innovation capabilities, to become more stringent as 
the distance to the technology frontier becomes smaller.   
Although initially developed for the analysis of firms, the technology capability concept 
may  also  be  applied  to  networks,  industries  or  countries.  Indeed,  a  central  insight  from  the 
literature on innovation is that a firm’s technological capabilities do not depend solely on its own   6 
activities but also the capabilities of its customers, suppliers and other firms and organizations 
with which the firm interacts (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993, Edquist 2004).  Lall (1992), in a 
survey  of  the  literature  on  technological  capabilities,  emphasized  three  aspects  of  “national 
technological capability:” the ability to muster the necessary (financial) resources and use them 
efficiently;  skills,  including  not  only  general  education  but  also  specialized  managerial  and 
technical competence; and a “national technological effort”, which he associated with measures 
such as R&D, patents and technical personnel. Lall also pointed to the incentives that economic 
agents face, whether resulting from political decision making (e.g., governance) or embedded in 
more  long-lasting  institutions  (the  legal  framework  for  example),  are  important  for  the 
development of technological capabilities and their economic effects. 
It is not a wholly new insight that the ability of a firm to generate and benefit from 
technological capabilities also depends on the social, institutional and political characteristics of 
the environment in which it is embedded. In fact, in the 1960s Adelman and Morris (1965, p. 
578) pointed out, based on an in-depth study of a number of indicators on development for a 
large number of countries, that “the purely economic performance of a community is strongly 
conditioned  by  the  social  and  political  setting  in  which  economic  activity  takes  place. 
Abramowitz (1986) described these characteristics as representing “social capability”, which he 
defined as “countries’ levels of general education and technical competence, the commercial, 
industrial and financial institutions that bear on the abilities to  finance and operate modern, 
large-scale  business,  and  the  political  and  social  characteristics  that  influence  the  risks,  the 
incentives and the personal rewards of economic activity” (Abramovitz 1994, p. 25). Putnam 
(1993, p. 167,) and other writers on “social capital” also point to the importance of  “features of 
social organization, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society 
by facilitating coordinated actions” (see also Woolcock and Narayan 2000).
2 Hence, there is no 
lack  of  literature  emphasizing  the  importance  of  social  factors  in  knowledge  diffusion.  The 
problem is rather how to exploit these insights in empirical research. This is one of the topics to 
be explored in the next section. 
                                                 
2  In  sociology  the  term  social  capital  is  often  used  as  an  attribute  of  individuals,  not  as  a  characteristic  of 
communities, as in the tradition from Putnam. For an overview and discussion of different usages of the term see 
Portes (1998).   7 
How countries or regions fare when it comes to developing and sustaining technological 
capabilities may also depend on more specific territorial characteristics. It has, for instance, been 
argued that larger and more densely populated regions are at advantage in this respect because of 
their larger markets for knowledge-intensive services and lower transaction costs, which allow 
for a richer set of capabilities to develop (Jacobs 1969, Bairoch 1988, Feldman 1994). Moreover, 
as  mentioned above, proximity to  other knowledge hubs  may  condition  the extent to  which 
capability development is enhanced by the activity of other actors located nearby (Feldman and 
Kogler 2010). Industrial structure may also influence the absorption of knowledge; specifically, 
industrial  specialization  may  allow  for  greater  exploitation  of  economies  of  scale  and  a 
deepening of technological capabilities due to the benefits of localization economies (Iammarino 
and McCain 2006). However, a highly specialized economy may also reduce the ability to absorb 
knowledge  by  limiting  the  scope  of  discovery  and  diversity  of  capabilities  (Feldman  and 
Audretsch 1999). Another means  to  diffuse knowledge is  the migration of skilled personnel 
(Henderson 2010). 
In summary, technological capability is a broad phenomenon that cannot be reduced to a 
single indicator, such as, for example, patents or R&D. A broader perspective is clearly needed 
and the next section considers this in more detail. Moreover, although diffusion of technology is 
challenging, it would be a mistake to conclude that a region on country cannot learn from regions 
with  more  developed  capabilities.  On  the  contrary,  as  emphasized  by  economic  historians 
(Gerschenkron 1962, Abramovitz 1986, Landes 1998), a technologically lagging region may 
benefit greatly by exploiting such technology gaps to its advantage. But success in doing so 
depends on characteristics at the receiving end, i.e., its capabilities, or in the words of Moses 
Abramovitz: “a country’s potential for rapid growth is strong not when it is backward without 
clarification, but rather when it is technologically backward but socially advanced”(Abramovitz 
1986, p. 388). Thus, technological dynamics—including the ability to learn from others—are 
conditioned by wider social, institutional and economic factors, which hence need to be taken 
into account.  
     8 
3. Measuring capabilities in Europe and the US 
 
Rather than taking into account the rich variation within the U.S. and Europe, current 
analyses often rely on mean values, ignoring the reality that territorial sub-units have autonomy 
in  defining  policies  that  influence  technological  dynamics,  as  well  as  differing  social, 
institutional and economic characteristics.  In contrast, this paper uses U.S. states and European 
countries as units of observation.
3  One challenge was finding comparable data relevant for the 
measurement of technological and social capabilities. The data set consists of observations for 48 
US states and 27 European countries between 2000, the year the Lisbon Strategy was adopted, 
and 2007.
4 
Technological capabilities are partly firm-level and partly characteristics of the external 
environments that firms share (and draw on for their technological activities). Indicators such as 
business R&D, patenting, etc. refer to the former, while university R&D, PhDs in science and 
engineering, scientific publications in science and engineering pertain to the latter. Alternatively, 
these  indicators  may  be  termed  innovation  capabilities.   Another  aspect  of  technological 
capability is so called investment capabilities, e.g. the ability to finance for new, technologically 
advanced initiatives, for which venture capital may be a good indicator. A third aspect refers to 
production capabilities, which—although less  advanced than the ones  mentioned above—are 
often considered to be of great importance in developing country environments. Examples of 
relevant  indicators  include  access  to  ICT  and  adherence  to  standards.    Unfortunately,  such 
indicators  were  not  available  for  the  present  study.  However,  since  the  countries  and  states 
included here are advanced compared to the developing world, and hence probably would have 
excelled  on  these  indicators,  the  lack  of  this  dimension  here  may  not  be  very  important  in 
practice.  
 
                                                 
3 Countries/regions not connected to the rest of continent were excluded (Hawaii and Alaska in the US, Iceland, 
Malta and Cyprus in Europe). In addition, in the US, the District of Columbia (home to the capital of the country) 
was excluded, because there is not a natural counterpart in Europe. 
4 See Appendix A1 for additional detail.    9 
Table 1: Technological capability: Descriptive statistics  
 










  Mean  CoV  Mean  CoV  Mean  CoV  Mean  CoV 
Scientific articles  986  0.57  1,006  0.53  670  0.76  758  0.66 
International patents  187  0.81  202  0.73  120  1.15  152  1.07 
Doctorates  130  0.42  147  0.44  129  0.58  178  0.55 
Business R&D  1.50  0.84  1.54  0.82  0.92  0.84  0.98  0.75 
University R&D  0.40  0.43  0.41  0.42  0.35  0.58  0.39  0.53 
Government R&D  0.39  2.89  0.37  2.63  0.20  0.49  0.19  0.45 
Venture capital  0.61  1.32  0.12  1.56  0.13  0.82  0.07  1.04 
Number of observations  48  27 
 
Note: CoV is the coefficient of variation. For GOVRD and UNIRD the initial period is 2002, i.e. 
not 2000, due to a break in time series in data for the US states. 
Source: See Appendix A1. 
 
Table  1  contains  descriptive  statistics  for  these  indicators  (means  and  coefficients  of 
variation) for the US and Europe, while sources are provided in Appendix Table A.1. The US is 
ahead of Europe on most indicators, including business R&D, international patents, and venture 
capital. It also leads in scientific publishing, but to some extent this may reflect that the US is 
home  to  the  majority  of  English-language  journals.  For  University  R&D  Europe  is 
approximately equivalent to the US. The only indicator for which Europe clearly outperforms the 
US is new PhDs in science and engineering, after having been relatively equivalent a decade ago. 
Government R&D appears to be a special case: the U.S. level doubles that of Europe, and the 
coefficients of variation are also notably higher. This reflects the importance of defense R&D in 
the US, which tends to be located in remote places away from other research environments, 
possibly to minimize spillovers, which in this case may be seen as a possible security risk or 
alternatively to provide a boost to lagging states. 
   10 





  TECH 
Scientific articles  0.93 
International patents  0.89 
Doctorates  0.75 
Business R&D  0.83 
University R&D  0.69 
Government R&D  0.09 
Venture capital  0.66 
Number of observations  150 
 
Note:  The  extraction  method  is  principal  component  factors;  based  on  pooled  data  for  75 
observations from the initial and final period (150 observations in total). 
Source: See Appendix A1. 
 
Next, we conducted a factor analysis of the eight indicators of technological capabilities 
for the two periods to examine to what extent these can usefully be aggregated into one or more 
common factors. To limit the influence of outliers, all variables are in logs. As is shown in Table 
2, only one principal factor, explaining 54.7% of the total variance, emerges from the analysis. 
This factor, which we label “Technological Capability”, is strongly correlated with the other 
indicators, with the sole exception of Government R&D, which is not significantly correlated 
with any other indicator.
5 The resulting factor score of the “Technological Capability” variable 
was normalized to a 0-100 range, with zero for the least advanced and one hundred for the most 
advanced region: 
      (
                    
                        
)    
                                                 
5 Indicators that do not fit into the overall pattern should in principle be eliminated because they may bias the results. 
If government R&D is eliminated, the proportion of variance explained by the single principal factor increases to 
63.8%. But is has only a negligible effect on the factor score, which is 99% correlated with the one reported here.   11 
Table 3: Technological capability, final period 
 
US states    EU/EFTA countries 
Top 10    Top 10 
Massachusetts  100    Sweden  86 
Maryland  82    Switzerland  83 
California  78    Finland  81 
Connecticut  76    Denmark  73 
Washington  75    United Kingdom  71 
New Hampshire  73    Netherlands  70 
Minnesota  72    Norway  69 
Pennsylvania  72    Germany  67 
Colorado  71    Austria  66 
Rhode Island  69    Belgium  64 
         
Average  60    Average  51 
Median  60    Median  54 
Coefficient of variation  0.23    Coefficient of variation  0.44 
         
Bottom 10    Bottom 10 
Kentucky  48    Estonia  44 
West Virginia  45    Luxembourg  43 
Wyoming  44    Hungary  35 
Oklahoma  43    Greece  34 
Maine  42    Lithuania  27 
Louisiana  42    Poland  27 
Mississippi  41    Slovakia  26 
South Dakota  38    Latvia  14 
Nevada  34    Romania  12 
Arkansas  31    Bulgaria  6 
Source: See Appendix A1.   12 
Table 3 reports the estimated levels of technological capability for the top and bottom 
ends of the distribution for the US and Europe.  Since the number of geographical units in the US 
is about twice that of Europe, the top quintile contains 10 states in the US and 5 countries 
Europe.  Comparing these two groups to each other leads to a very clear result: there are not any 
significant differences between the top performers in the two continents. In fact, the top five 
performers of the two continents combined include two US states, Massachusetts and Maryland, 
and three European countries, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland. This differs markedly for the 
bottom end of the distribution. Six countries, which are all former Socialist economies in Eastern 
Europe, have lower technological capabilities than the least sophisticated US state. Omitting 
these six countries from the calculation of the mean level of technological capability in Europe 
gives a result that is almost identical to that of the US. Hence, if we focus on Western Europe, 
then the much-discussed difference in technological capability vis-à-vis the US more or less 
vanishes.  
To get a better impression of the technological dynamics, Figure 1 plots the initial level 
of  Technological  capability  (TECH)  on  the  vertical  axis  against  the  change  of  this  variable 
(TECH1 – TECH0) on the horizontal axis, forming quadrants. The top left quadrant consists of 
initially advanced regions that grow slowly, if at all, while the bottom right quadrant contains 
initially  lagging  regions  that  are  catching  up  technologically.  The  great  majority  of  the 
observations  fall  into  these  two  quadrants,  indicating  that  there  has  been  a  fair  amount  of 
technological convergence during the period covered by the investigation. The catching-up group 
consists of a number of European countries, including some former Socialist countries (the Baltic 
Countries, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria), but also some US 
states, such as North and South Dakota and Wyoming. 
   13 




Although the main trend points towards convergence, there are also in the bottom left 
quadrant  a number of initially lagging  regions, mostly American states,  with  below average 
performance. These risk falling behind, to use Abramowitz’s terminology (Abramovitz 1986).
6 
Finally there are in the top right quadrant a small number of advanced regions, mostly European, 
that continue to pull ahead, among which Switzerland and Norway are the two most obvious 
examples.  
 
                                                 
6 It is interesting in light of recent economic developments to observe that Greece is the clearest example in Europe 
of an initially lagging country that is also “falling behind” technologically. The other European countries that risk 
being dragged into the present macro-economic crisis, such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, appear to have a different 
dynamics.   14 
Next,  we  searched  for  data  on  what  Abramovitz  (19861)  called  social  capabilities. 
Following the literature, three aspects may be distinguished: the skill-level of the labor force; 
how well governance works (particularly with respect to economic activity); and the prevalence 
of norms, values and institutions that support economic activities and the functioning of society 
more generally. Relatively good statistics existed on the supply of well-educated personnel and 
the quality of the educational system (as reflected by teacher-pupil ratios). However, reliable and 
relevant  indicators on governance that covered  both  US  states  and European countries  were 
difficult to find. For example, many of the data sources that Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) use to 
explore these aspects do not exist for sub-national entities. Nevertheless, we chose to consider 
information on the ability of the government to engage the population in economic activities 
(unemployment and labor force participation). With respect to the broader social characteristics 
emphasized by Abramovitz and others, we were able to include information on election turnout, 
a commonly used indicator of civic activity and, hence, social capital; income inequality; and the 
frequency  of  homicides.  The  latter  reflects  the  importance  of  public  safety  in  civic  society.  
However, as shown in Appendix Table 2, the frequency of homicides is also strongly correlated 
with a number of other relevant indicators, such as willingness to take part in civic activities, 
satisfaction with how society is governed and indicators of law and order at the country level . 
Hence, we regard the frequency of homicides as an indicator of broader social characteristics as 
well. 
Table 4 contains descriptive statistics on the indicators of social capability. It appears that 
on average there are no large differences between the two continents with respect to the supply 
of  skilled  personnel  and  the  quality  of  the  educational  system.  There  are,  however,  marked 
differences along the other dimensions included here, particularly inequality and homicide rates, 
which are more pronounced in the US, and unemployment, which appears to be a larger problem 
in Europe.     
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Table 4: Social capabilities: Descriptive statistics 
 
  United States  Europe 
  Mean  CoV  Mean  CoV 
Labor force with tertiary education (% of labor force)  22.35  0.19  21.16  0.34 
Professional and associated jobs (% total jobs)  30.70  0.10  34.51  0.17 
Teacher-pupil  ratio  in  public  schools  in  elementary  and 
secondary education  0.07  0.13  0.08  0.18 
Income inequality (quintile share ratio)  6.65  0.12  4.31  0.22 
Election turnout (% of voting-age population)  52.87  0.13  69.32  0.17 
Homicides (per million adults)  59.42  0.55  33.33  1.07 
Unemployment (% of labor force)  3.83  0.23  8.44  0.57 
Labor force participation (% of working age population)  78.31  0.05  69.81  0.08 
Number of observations  48  27 
 
Note: CoV is the coefficient of variation.  
Source: See Appendix A1. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of a factor analysis on the social capability data set for the 
initial year (some of the indicators are not available for the recent years). As in the previous case, 
the indicators are entered in logarithmic forms. Three principal factors with eigenvalues higher 
than one, explaining 78.2% of the total variance, were detected. First, there is a factor that loads 
highly on tertiary education and the share of professionals in the labor force and is hence labeled 
Educated Labor. Second, there is a factor score that combines the various social characteristics, 
which we label  as Social Cohesion. This factor loads positively on election turnout and the 
quality  of  the  public  school  system  and  negatively  on  income  inequality  and  the  rate  of 
homicides.  The  correlation  is  particularly  high  with  the  rate  of  homicides,  which  arguably 
reflects the strong relationship between this indicator and other relevant social characteristics 
(see Table A2 in Appendix). Finally, there is a third principal factor that loads negatively on 
unemployment and positively on participation in the labor force, labeled Labor Market. 
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  EDU  SOC  MKT 
Labor force with tertiary education  0.82  -0.11  0.30 
Professional and associated jobs  0.89  0.15  -0.16 
Teacher-pupil ratio in public schools  -0.17  0.72  -0.04 
Income inequality  -0.16  -0.74  0.30 
Election turnout  0.17  0.82  -0.16 
Homicides  0.05  -0.91  -0.30 
Unemployment  0.05  -0.10  -0.96 
Labor force participation  0.19  -0.17  0.82 
Number of observations  75 
Note: The extraction method is principal component factors; oblimin oblique rotation; based on 
data from the initial period. 
Source: See Appendix A1. 
 
Table 6 provides information on the estimated levels of the three measures of social 
capability for the top and bottom ends of the distribution for the US and Europe. The top five 
performers  in  Educated  Labor  are  all  European.  Only  two  US  states,  Massachusetts  and 
Maryland, make it to the top ten.  There is less difference towards the end of the distribution, 
however. For example, the bottom ten performers contain 6 US states and 4 European countries. 
In the case of Social Cohesion the difference between the US and Europe is much larger. In fact, 
no US state makes it to the top ten and around one half of them have levels of Social Cohesion 
below that of the socially least advanced country in Europe. Thus, European countries and US 
states  are  not  in  the  same  category  when  it  comes  to  economically  important  social 
characteristics. This also holds for the Labor Market factor, but in this case it is the US states that 
are  far  ahead  of  European  countries.  In  fact,  no  European  country  makes  it  to  the  top  ten 
performers  on  this  dimension,  and  the  great  majority  has  values  below  that  of  the  worst 
performing US state.  These results are consistent with the well-known US-Europe employment 
gap that proliferated during the 1980s and 1990s (Gregory, et al. 2007).   17 
Table 6a: Educated Labor (EDU), initial period 
 
US states    EU/EFTA countries 
Top 10    Top 10 
Massachusetts  84    Finland  100 
Maryland  83    Sweden  92 
Connecticut  78    Norway  91 
Washington  76    Netherlands  89 
Colorado  74    United Kingdom  86 
Minnesota  73    Estonia  83 
New York  71    Belgium  83 
Virginia  70    Denmark  82 
New Hampshire  70    Germany  80 
New Jersey  70    Switzerland  79 
         
Average  60    Average  65 
Median  61    Median  67 
Coefficient of variation  0.19    Coefficient of variation  0.35 
         
Bottom 10    Bottom 10 
Alabama  51    Spain  53 
South Carolina  51    Czech Republic  53 
Louisiana  50    Hungary  52 
Tennessee  49    Poland  49 
Indiana  44    Slovakia  49 
Mississippi  43    Austria  46 
Kentucky  42    Greece  45 
West Virginia  38    Italy  39 
Arkansas  37    Romania  30 
Nevada  29    Portugal  0 
Source: See Appendix A1.     18 
Table 6b: Social Cohesion (SOC), initial period 
 
US states    EU/EFTA countries 
Top 10    Top 10 
North Dakota  65    Luxembourg  100 
Maine  61    Denmark  92 
South Dakota  60    Austria  92 
Vermont  59    Norway  88 
Iowa  54    Hungary  85 
Wyoming  49    Italy  82 
New Hampshire  49    Sweden  81 
Wisconsin  46    Belgium  80 
Montana  44    Slovenia  74 
Minnesota  42    Germany  70 
         
Average  29    Average  64 
Median  27    Median  59 
Coefficient of variation  0.54    Coefficient of variation  0.31 
         
Bottom 10    Bottom 10 
Maryland  15    Romania  56 
New Mexico  15    Bulgaria  55 
Tennessee  15    Finland  53 
Texas  14    Czech Republic  52 
Georgia  13    Ireland  51 
Mississippi  13    Poland  43 
Florida  12    United Kingdom  38 
Nevada  9    Latvia  37 
California  2    Lithuania  30 
Arizona  0    Estonia  28 
Source: See Appendix A1.     19 
Table 6c. Labor Market (MKT), initial period 
 
US states    EU/EFTA countries 
Top 10    Top 10 
South Dakota  100    Switzerland  84 
North Dakota  94    Norway  76 
Connecticut  94    Portugal  68 
Iowa  91    Netherlands  64 
New Hampshire  91    Denmark  62 
Vermont  89    United Kingdom  59 
Massachusetts  86    Austria  58 
Nebraska  86    Luxembourg  58 
Virginia  86    Sweden  54 
Colorado  85    Ireland  52 
         
Average  72    Average  38 
Median  71    Median  33 
Coefficient of variation  0.17    Coefficient of variation  0.61 
         
Bottom 10    Bottom 10 
Arizona  64    Czech Republic  27 
Kentucky  62    Greece  27 
Arkansas  61    Estonia  20 
California  61    Hungary  18 
New York  60    Lithuania  14 
Alabama  57    Italy  12 
New Mexico  54    Poland  11 
Mississippi  52    Latvia  10 
West Virginia  48    Slovakia  6 
Louisiana  44    Bulgaria  0 
Source: See Appendix A1.   20 
 
The analysis of technological and social capabilities in the US and Europe shows that 
there are marked differences both within and across the two continents in the various aspects 
taken into account here.  It is not obvious from looking at these data that there exists a typical US 
state or —alternatively— a typical European country. As pointed out in the introduction to this 
paper, typologies consistent with the data may just as well cut across the two continents. To 
explore this question further, we carry out a cluster analysis of the geographical units included in 
our analysis based on their initial technological and social capabilities (TECH, EDU, SOC and 
MKT). Cluster analysis is an exploratory tool, which sorts similar units into groups so that the 
degree of association between the units is maximal if they belong to the same group and minimal 
otherwise. Various clustering methods are available, but since we did not wish to determine the 
number of clusters a’ priori, hierarchical cluster analysis was used.  
Figure 2 presents the results of the analysis in the form of a dendogram. From the results 
it is clear that there is a cluster of European countries to the right on the dendogram that differs 
from the remaining US states and European countries in important respects. There is also a 
cluster of US states to the left that appears to be quite different from the rest. What emerges from 
the  analysis  is  a  division  into  three  major  clusters:  i)  A  US  cluster  that  we  label  the  “US 
periphery” (the left branch); ii) a European cluster labeled the “European periphery” (the right 
branch); and finally iii) a mix of European countries and US regions (in the middle) that combine 
north-western Europe and the northern US states.  We call this cluster the US and European 
core. 
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Figure 2: European countries and US states: A Cluster analysis 
 
 
Note. Dendrogram: Ward’s linkage and Euclidean (dis)similarity measure. Based on initial levels 
of TECH, EDU, SOC and MKT. 
 
The characteristics of these three clusters in terms of the variables taken into account by 
the analysis are presented in Table 7. The 43 entities included in the core compose a relatively 
homogenous group of regions characterized by high technological capability, a highly educated 
labor force, and high labor force participation. Social conditions differ considerably though. The 
16 regions included in the US periphery differ from the core in that they have less technological 
capability and a much smaller qualified labor force. Social conditions are also much worse on 
average. Finally, the European periphery is a relatively heterogeneous cluster characterized by, 
on average, very low levels of technological capability and labor force participation rates but 
relatively  good  social  conditions  and—at  least  compared  to  the  US  periphery—levels  of   22 
education. Hence, this group of countries seems—to some extent at least—to fit Abramovitz’s 
description of being “technologically backward but socially advanced.”  
 
Table 7: Cluster characteristics  
  US & Europe core   US periphery  Europe periphery 
  Mean  CoV  Mean  CoV  Mean  CoV 
TECH  67  0.20  51  0.21  29  0.60 
EDU  70  0.16  48  0.18  52  0.38 
SOC  44  0.47  17  0.46  62  0.35 
MKT  71  0.23  63  0.14  27  0.75 
Number of observations  43  16  16 
 
Note: Cov is the coefficient of variation.  
 
4. Exploring technological dynamics 
 
Having  dealt  with  how  US  states  and  European  countries  perform  in  terms  of 
technological and social capabilities, this section investigates the factors that shape the evolution 
of technological capability over time.  Hence, the dependent variable in our analysis will be the 
change in technological capability, which is assumed to depend on the ability for learning from 
others (given by the existence of more advanced capabilities elsewhere), the social capabilities of 
the region, and other conditioning factors that have been identified in the literature as being 
relevant for territorial dynamics.   The model may be seen as an application of the standard 
epidemic model of technology diffusion (Metcalfe 1988, Fagerberg et al. 2007) which has been 
widely used in econometric studies of economic growth and technological change (see Fagerberg 
1994  for  an  overview  of  some  of  this  literature)  or  technological  change  across  countries 
(Fagerberg  and  Verspagen  1996,  Fagerberg  et  al.  1997,  Sala-i-Martin  1996).  This  model  is 
sometimes  characterized  as  a  conditional  convergence  model,  although,  depending  on  the 
parameterization, it may be consistent with theories predicting convergence (Solow 1956) as 
well as divergence across countries or regions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995).    23 
The basic model that we will use is the following: 
                      
                                                         
in which TECH is an indicators of technological and EDU, SOC and MKT are indicators 
of social capabilities; X is a set of other conditioning factors; and  e is the standard i.i.d. residual. 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, knowledge flows may also be conditioned by distance. However, 
the available research shows that to the extent that this is the case, the effects tend to be fairly 
local.  Typically,  spatially  conditioned  knowledge  or  technology  spillovers  are  shown  to  be 
limited to a radius of about 200 to 400 km (Feldman and Kogler 2010), which would generally 
fall  within  the  borders of  our  relatively  large  geographical  units.  But  there  could  be  spatial 
spillovers along shared borders. The variable TECHspill tests for the possibility of interaction 
effects between the technological capabilities of regions with common borders. This variable 
represents  the  technological  capabilities  of  neighboring  regions  weighted  by,  for  each 
neighboring region, the common border as a share of the total border of the receiving region:
7 
 
             ∑                 
   
∑    
    
where  i  is  the  receiving  region,  j  is  the  neighboring  region,  TECH  is  as  before 
technological capability, bij is the length of the common border, and ∑  denotes the total length 
of the border. Since, by definition, there is little to learn from those who are less knowledgeable 
than yourself, we impose the restriction that                      if                < 0.    
Knowledge or technology spillovers may also depend on movements of people—i.e., the 
migration of skilled personnel across country or state borders. However, for the present sample, 
                                                 
7  The total border of a region includes in addition to borders to neighboring regions in the sample also coastline, 
shoreline, and borders with countries or regions not included in the present sample. Data on the length of the land 
borders  between  the  US  states  was  obtained  from  The  State  Border  Data  Set 
(http://www.econ.umn.edu/~holmes/data/BorderData.html). There are 109 borders between contiguous states. Data 
on the US-Canada or US-Mexico border length, the length of the coastline and the length of the shoreline of the 
Great Lakes was obtained from the US statistical Abstract 2010. Data on the length of the land borders between the 
European countries and their total border length, including coastline, was derived from the on-line edition of the 
CIA World Factbook.   24 
information on the skill level of migrants was not available.  Therefore, following Crescenzi et 
al. (2007), we used net migration as a share of the total population of the region.
8 
As  noted  earlier,  the  analysis  also  includes  variables  reflecting  relevant  territorial 
characteristics, such as population density (PODEN), SIZE of the region (as indicated by 
population), both in logs and its degree of specialization (K-index). The latter was, following the 
method of Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2002) and Crescenzi et al. (2007), measured as the deviation 
from an average pattern of specialization of the geographical entities included in the sample.
9 
Table 8 presents the results. Regressions results robust to outliers, based on the procedure 
suggested by Li (1985), are reported. The first column presents results of the basic model in 
which change in technological capability is regressed against initial values of the technological 
and social capabilities. The initial level of technological capability TECH displays a large and 
significantly negative coefficient, indicating a strong tendency for conditional technological 
catching up. EDU and SOC are also positive and significant; hence, a well-educated labor force 
and favorable social conditions are clearly important for the development of technological 
capability. However, the estimated coefficient for the Labor Market factor score MKT, tough 
positive as expected, fails to be significant at a 10% level. Columns 2-6 then one-by-one include 
the other possible conditioning factors discussed above, but in no case are the estimated impacts 
significantly different from zero. Since the scope for spatially conditioned spillovers may be 
different for the individual elements in TECH, we repeated the test for different definitions of 
TECHspill, but the results hold (results available on request from the authors ). Column 7 
provides the full model, which includes all variables considered so far.  Th e main results do not 
change. Finally, a backward search regression was conducted, eliminating the insignificant 
variables one by one, the results of which lead to the “best model” reported in Column 8 (a 10% 
level of statistical significance level was adopted for inclusion in the final reporting). 
 
                                                 
8 The MIGRATE variable was calculated as the net (im)migration rate in the initial year given by (POP1-POP0-
births+deaths)/POP0, in which POP is population and the 0, 1 subscripts indicate  the beginning and the end of the 
year, respectively. 
9 The K- index is based on GDP data by 25 sectors according to NACE, rev. 1.1 in Europe and the 2002 NAICS  
classification in the US.  It is computed on the base of the overall sample, i.e. not for Europe and the US separately, 
because after some adjustments the industry definition at the chosen level of aggregation was very similar. More 
details on the computation are available from the authors upon request.   25 
Table 8: Exploring technological dynamics  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Constant  0.75  0.52  0.98  1.52  0.11  -1.52  -11.49  1.54 
  (0.33)  (0.20)  (0.42)  (0.54)  (0.01)  (-0.51)  (1.04)  (0.75) 
TECH  -0.19  -0.19  -0.19  -0.19  -0.19  -0.16  -0.15  -0.18 
  (5.72)***  (4.94)***  (5.67)***  (4.97)***  (4.91)***  (4.08)***  (3.31)***  (6.59)*** 
EDU  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.09  0.09  0.10 
  (2.84)***  (2.80)***  (2.80)***  (2.82)***  (2.76)***  (2.39)**  (2.34)**  (2.74)*** 
SOC  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
  (3.41)***  (3.26)***  (3.22)***  (3.41)***  (3.39)***  (3.48)***  (3.28)***  (3.37)*** 
MKT  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03  .. 
  (0.77)  (0.61)  (0.76)  (0.45)  (0.65)  (0.59)  (0.76)   
TECHspill  ..  0.01  ..  ..  ..  ..  0.02  .. 
    (0.21)          (0.48)   
MIGRATE  ..  ..  -0.33  ..  ..  ..  -0.51  .. 
      (0.57)        (0.78)   
POPDEN  ..  ..  ..  -0.20  ..  ..  -0.24  .. 
        (0.46)      (0.48)   
SIZE  ..  ..  ..  ..  0.04  ..  0.61  .. 
          (0.08)    (1.00)   
K-INDEX  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  0.06  0.07  .. 
            (1.16)  (1.22)   
R
2  0.46  0.46  0.47  0.46  0.46  0.47  0.44  0.46 
AICR  69.04  68.81  63.21  69.01  71.09  69.67  88.85  65.42 
BICR  82.96  85.71  80.81  85.93  87.71  86.68  116.09  76.67 
Deviance  828.16  830.57  835.65  827.71  827.20  813.84  874.24  838.34 
F  19.01***  14.90***  15.28***  15.20***  14.83***  15.30***  7.56***  25.46*** 
N  75  75  75  75  75  75  75  75 
Note: Robust regressions (OLS),rreg command in Stata 11.Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets; *, **, *** denote significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.   26 
Hence, while there is strong support for the hypothesis that the scope for technology 
diffusion  and  well-developed  social  capabilities  matter,  there  is  little  support  for  the  other 
variables included in the model. This result may be influenced by heterogeneity in technological 
and territorial dynamics across the two continents, as suggested by Crescenzi et al. (2007). To 
allow for this possibility, the two last models of Table 8 were tested with Europe-specific and 
Cluster-specific  slope  dummies  for  all  variables  included.    An  F-test  was  conducted  on  the 
hypothesis that these interaction terms were jointly equal to zero. In the case of the “best model”  
(column 8, Table 8), the results from this test indicate that there are no significant differences 
either across the two continents or across the three clusters identified above in terms of the 
impact  of initial  technological  capability, the educational  standard of the labor force, or the 
degree of social cohesion. However, for the “full model” (column 7, Table 8), the hypothesis that 
the interaction terms were all equal to zero is rejected at the 10% and 1% levels of significance 
for the two continents and the three clusters, respectively.  Hence, in order to explore in more 
depth the possible sources of heterogeneity in technological and territorial dynamics across the 
US and Europe, we repeated the tests of columns 2 to 6 in Table 8, but this time allowing for 
possible  differences  across  the  US  and  Europe  in  the  impact  of  the  additional  variable  in 
question. The results of these tests are reported in Table 9.  
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Table 9a: Technological dynamics: Testing for differences across the US and Europe 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant  2.46  1.47  2.68  3.64  15.41  -0.12 
  (1.04)  (0.58)  (1.26)  (1.47)  (1.67)  (0.04) 
TECH  -0.20  -0.16  -0.19  -0.15  -0.13  -0.11 
  (6.19)***  (5.32)***  (6.82)***  (4.39)***  (3.54)***  (2.81)*** 
EDU  0.09  0.09  0.11  0.09  0.07  0.05 
  (2.33)**  (2.20)**  (2.98)***  (2.16)**  (1.50)  (1.12) 
SOC  0.03  0.06  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.05 
  (0.98)  (2.63)**  (1.47)  (1.50)  (0.74)  (2.15)** 
MKT  0.03  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
  (1.39)           
EUROPE*MKT  0.07  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
  (2.45)**           
TECHspill  ..  -0.01  ..  ..  ..  .. 
    (0.20)         
EUROPE*TECHspill  ..  0.05  ..  ..  ..  .. 
    (1.18)         
MIGRATE  ..  ..  -0.61  ..  ..  .. 
      (1.03)       
EUROPE*MIGRATE  ..  ..  5.02  ..  ..  .. 
      (1.71)*       
POPDEN  ..  ..  ..  -0.66  ..  .. 
        (1.37)     
EUROPE*POPDEN  ..  ..  ..  0.58  ..  .. 
        (1.45)     
SIZE  ..  ..  ..  ..  -0.88  .. 
          (1.53)   
EUROPE*SIZE  ..  ..  ..  ..  0.24  .. 
          (1.73)*   
K-INDEX  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  0.04 
            (0.67) 
EUROPE*K-INDEX  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  0.07 
            (1.63) 
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R
2  0.49  0.46  0.49  0.49  0.48  0.47 
AICR  75.16  73.51  60.79  57.41  67.69  77.68 
BICR  91.29  90.01  78.68  75.56  84.58  93.84 
Deviance  751.23  809.36  808.62  823.18  805.08  778.32 
F  16.77***  14.75***  16.33***  15.92***  15.32***  15.43*** 
N  75  75  75  75  75  75 
Note: Robust regressions (OLS),rreg command in Stata 11.Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels. 
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Table 9b: Technological dynamics: Testing for differences across the clusters 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant  -2.55  1.87  1.17  -1.69  4.16  -1.86 
  (0.82)  (0.73)  (0.55)  (0.55)  (0.64)  (0.48) 
TECH  -0.20  -0.16  -0.18  -0.12  -0.13  -0.13 
  (5.91)***  (5.44)***  (6.41)***  (3.33)***  (3.51)***  (2.83)*** 
EDU  0.16  0.08  0.12  0.14  0.12  0.08 
  (3.61)***  (2.08)**  (3.33)***  (3.25)***  (2.81)***  (1.74)* 
SOC  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.07 
  (1.58)  (2.46)**  (2.22)**  (2.40)**  (2.28)**  (2.91)*** 
MKT  0.03  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
  (1.34)           
Cluster1*MKT  0.01  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
  (0.53)           
Cluster3*MKT  0.11           
  (2.18)**           
TECHspill  ..  0.04  ..  ..  ..  .. 
    (1.20)         
Cluster1*TECHspill  ..  -0.06  ..  ..  ..  .. 
    (1.40)         
Cluster3*TECHspill    0.00         
    (0.04)         
MIGRATE  ..  ..  -1.22  ..  ..  .. 
      (1.16)       
Cluster1*MIGRATE  ..  ..  1.06  ..  ..  .. 
      (0.84)       
Cluster3*MIGRATE      3.66       
      (1.08)       
POPDEN  ..  ..  ..  -0.74  ..  .. 
        (1.66)     
Cluster1*POPDEN  ..  ..  ..  0.49  ..  .. 
        (1.17)     
Cluster3*POPDEN        1.02     
        (2.25)**     
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SIZE  ..  ..  ..  ..  -0.44  .. 
          (1.00)   
Cluster1*SIZE  ..  ..  ..  ..  0.08  .. 
          (0.75)   
Cluster3*SIZE          0.23   
          (1.81)*   
K-INDEX  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  0.07 
            (1.30) 
Cluster1*K-INDEX  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  0.00 
            (0.01) 
Cluster3*K-INDEX            0.03 
            (0.52) 
R
2  0.47  0.48  0.44  0.48  0.45  0.46 
AICR  84.54  70.77  79.08  79.39  86.84  81.13 
BICR  102.31  90.76  98.67  98.01  104.43  99.68 
Deviance  748.47  800.77  907.39  754.89  774.59  795.46 
F  13.21***  12.95***  12.52***  14.05***  12.54***  12.06*** 
N  75  75  75  75  75  75 
Note: Robust regressions (OLS), rreg command in Stata 11. Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels. 31 
 
In general, the results do not provide strong support for the hypothesis of significant 
differences within the sample in terms of what shapes technological dynamics. The only notable 
exception  is  for  the  Labor  Market  factor,  which  is  found  to  matter  more  in  Europe,  and 
particularly in the European periphery, than in the US. This result, which is significant at the 5% 
level, indicates that failing to keep unemployment low (and participation in the labor force high), 
has a cost beyond immediate economic effects, by hampering long term growth of technological 
capability and, hence, the future development of the country. Interestingly, the introduction of 
continent and cluster specific terms for the impact of the Labor Market renders the effect of 
Social Cohesion insignificant, indicating perhaps that in Europe high labor market participation 
and well developed Social Cohesion may go hand in hand and are thus difficult to distinguish in 
terms of their effects. 
There  is  more  diversity  if  the  weaker  10%  significance  criterion  for  acceptance  of 
continent or cluster specific effects on variables impact is adopted. For example, in this case 
there is some evidence suggesting—in contrast to earlier research (Crescenzi et al. 2007)—that 
the effects of migration on growth of technological capability are more positive in Europe than in 
the  US.  The  same  holds  for  regional  size  and,  in  the  case  of  the  European  periphery,  also 
population density. However, and again in contrast to previous research (Crescenzi et al. 2007), 
there are no significant differences across continents or clusters with respect to the effects of 
spatially conditioned knowledge, technology spillovers, or specialization.  
As pointed out above, some of these results run counter to those reported by Crescenzi et 
al.  (2007)  for  their  earlier  time  period.  They  found  that  spatially  conditioned  technology 
spillovers  mattered  in  Europe  but  not  in  the  US,  while  this  relationship  was  vice-versa  for 
migration; however, these findings are not supported here. It should be noted, though, that there 
are a number of differences between the present study and that of Crescenzi et al.  First, as 
pointed  out  in  the  introduction,  their  dependent  variable  is  patent  growth,  not  the  broader 
technological capability measure preferred here. However, replacing our technological capability 
variable with a patent-based measure turned out to have no effect on the results (available from 
the authors on request).  Second, Crescenzi et al. compare US cities to European regions (at the 
NUTS 1-2 level, i.e., countries or parts thereof), and although it cannot be excluded a priori that 
this leads a different result, it is difficult to see why that would be the case. Third, the present 
study considers a more recent time period and includes the countries in Eastern Europe (which 32 
 
were excluded by Crescenzi et al.). This may well explain some of the differences, particularly 
with  respect  to  migration.  During  the  1990s  the  EU  started  on  a  reform  path  (the  internal 
market), with the explicit goal of making cross-border economic activities, including migration, 
easier;  at  the  same  time,  the  new  democracies  in  Eastern  Europe  gradually  became  more 
integrated  into  the  European  economy.  Increased  migration  of  relatively  skilled  personnel, 
particularly from the East to the West, followed in the wake of these changes. This increased 
mobility of personnel, which while perhaps a mixed blessing for Eastern Europe, was most likely 
beneficial for a number of European countries, which improved their technological capabilities 
rapidly during this period, such as Spain, Luxemburg and Ireland, which all had net inward 
migration rates far above the European average.  
 





Note: Based on column 8 in Table 8.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates how the variables taken into account here explain the changes in 
technological capability relative to the sample average in the two continents (three clusters). The 
figure is based on the best model in Table 8  (column 8).   The US states were, on average, more 
advanced technologically to begin with than their European counterparts, indicating a smaller 33 
 
potential for learning from others. This contributed to somewhat slower growth in the US. This 
outcome is, however, accentuated by lack of social cohesion, which drags down growth in the 
US while boosting it in Europe. The negative effect of lacking social cohesion in the US is 
particularly  evident  for  the  US  periphery,  which  is  falling  behind  technologically.  The 
periphery’s slow growth relative to the average also reflects a failure to invest sufficiently in 
education. In contrast, the European periphery is catching up at rapid rate due to a much larger 
potential  for  learning  supported  by  favorable  social  conditions.  There  is  some  indication, 
however, that lack of investments in education is hampering the growth in these countries too, 
though less so than for the US periphery. Some of the success of the countries in the European 
periphery, and hence for Europe as a whole, remains unaccounted for by the model, which can 
be attributed perhaps to the fact that the majority of the countries in this cluster consists are so-
called “transition countries” (former socialist economies). 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Around  the  turn  of  the  millennium,  policy  makers,  particularly  in  Europe  but  also 
elsewhere, began explaining the inability to realize economic objectives on the lack of R&D 
investments.  Hence,  increasing  R&D  investments  was  seen  as  an  appropriate  strategy  for 
addressing the lack of economic growth.  While R&D are certainly important, both theory and 
the empirical evidence suggest that R&D investments need to be accompanied by a number of 
complementary  technological,  social  and  institutional  factors,  to  deliver  desired  results. 
However, the real challenge is to exploit this insight in research.  Moreover, most previous work 
on  this  issue  compares  the  US  as  whole  to  individual  European  countries,  which  given  the 
difference in size and the heterogeneous character of U.S. states is not the most appropriate 
comparison.  This paper therefore changes the unit of observation from the entire U.S. economy 
to individual states, which arguably are more comparable to European countries than the US as 
whole.   
The theoretical perspective that has guided our research suggests that it is necessary to 
take  into  account  both  technological  and  social  capabilities.  As  for  technological  capability, 
which includes not only R&D but also a number of other aspects related to exploration and 34 
 
exploitation of knowledge, the results suggest that most European countries are just as capable as 
US states. Hence, the worry expressed by many European policy makers over Europe lagging 
behind the US along this dimension appears misguided. In fact, the major difference between the 
two continents is not so much related to their top performers as to the fact that Europe includes a 
number of formerly Socialist countries in Eastern Europe, which understandably have not yet 
managed to generate technological capabilities comparable to those of Western Europe. As for 
social capabilities, the analysis suggests that while education is a strong point for Europe, the 
ability to engage the population in productive activities is not, at least when compared to the US.  
On the latter dimension there is a marked difference across the two continents. However, the 
biggest difference is to  be found in what has been termed “social  cohesion,” which reflects 
norms, values, and institutions that facilitate economic activities, and for which US states tend to 
lag considerably behind Europe.  
The  results  reached  in  this  paper  give  strong  support  for  the  theoretical  perspective 
outlined in section 2.  The development of technological capability is not a zero-sum game. 
Learning from the efforts of others is an important factor contributing to technological capability, 
particularly in technologically less advanced regions. However, as pointed out by Abramovitz,   
“The potential for rapid growth is strong not when it is backward without clarification, but rather 
when it is technologically backward but socially advanced” (Abramovitz 1986: p. 388).  The 
results  reported  here  are  consistent  with  this  perspective:  Well  developed  social  capabilities 
impact the degree to which countries and regions succeed in tapping into the global knowledge 
pool and exploiting it to their own advantage. Policy makers who do not take these lessons into 
account may fail to reach the desired results of the policies they pursue. 
It  has  been  common  among  policy  makers,  media  and  also  scholars  who  study  the 
difference in performance across the US and Europe to assume that the two systems work rather 
differently. The research presented here does not support this perspective but rather, suggests—at 
least as far as technological dynamics is concerned—that the underlying factors that influence 
dynamics among European countries as well as US states tend to be the same in most cases. 
However, since both Europe and the US are quite heterogeneous entities, the observed dynamics 
may well differ, as may the future growth challenges ahead.  Due to its recent history, Europe 
has much larger internal differences in technological capability, and this has contributed to more 
vibrant internal dynamics, with several previously Socialist countries in the East catching up 35 
 
technologically at rapid speed. The challenge for European policy makers, in a time of crisis, will 
be to sustain this fortuitous trend by continuing to invest in education and preventing social 
conditions, for example unemployment, from deteriorating. In contrast to the European example, 
technological differences in the US are widening, in large part due to the combination of skill 
shortages and adverse social conditions, which are especially characteristic for lagging regions. 
To reverse this trend, policies focusing narrowly on investments in R&D will not suffice. What 
is needed are comprehensive policies targeting the skills of the population and the broader social 
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Appendix A1. Overview of the variables 
 
Indicator  Unit  Source of data  Period 
    US states  EU countries     
Scientific articles: The number of articles 
published in journals classified and covered by 
Science Citation Index (SCI) and Social 
Sciences Citation Index (SSCI); fractional 
assignments. 
Per  million 
working-age 
population  
The Patent Board 
NSF,  Science  and 
Engineering 
Indicators 2010 
2000  2007 
International patents: The number of PCT 
patent applications; fractional counts; by 
inventor(s)'s country(ies) of residence and by 
the priority date  
Per  million 
working-age 
population 
OECD  REGPAT 
Database 
OECD  Patent 
Database  2000  2007 
Doctorate: The number of science and 
engineering doctorate graduates (level 6 of 
ISCED 1997) 
Per  million 
working-age 
population 
NSF,  S&E  State 
Profiles  Eurostat on-line  2000  2007 
Business R&D : Expenditures on R&D 
performed by the business sector  % of GDP  OECD.Stat  Regional 
Statistics  Eurostat on-line  2000  2007 
University R&D : Expenditures on R&D 
performed by the higher education and private 
and non-profit sectors 
% of GDP  OECD.Stat  Regional 
Statistics  Eurostat on-line  2002  2007 
Government R&D: Expenditures on R&D 
performed by the government sector  % of GDP  OECD.Stat  Regional 
Statistics  Eurostat on-line  2002  2007 
Venture capital: Early stage, expansion and 
replacement venture capital investments  % of GDP  SSTI  and  the  PWC 
Moneytree Report  Eurostat on-line  2000  2007 
Tertiary education: Attainment of tertiary 
education (levels 5-6 of ISCED 1997)  % of labor force  OECD.Stat  Regional 
Statistics  Eurostat on-line  2000 
Professionals: Senior officials, professionals, 
technicians and associate professionals; 11-31 
codes of SOC in the US  and 1-3 codes of 
ISCO88 in Europe. 
%  of  total 
employees 
BLS,  Occupational 
Employment 
Statistics 
Eurostat on-line  2000 
Teacher-pupil ratio: The ratio of teachers to 
students in elementary and secondary public 
schools (levels 1-3 of ISCED 1997) 
Teachers  per 
student 
National  Center  for 
Education Statistics  Eurostat on-line  2000 
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Income inequality: The ratio of total income 
received by the 20 % of the population with 
the highest income (top quintile) to that 
received by the 20 % of the population with 
the lowest income (lowest quintile). 
Top  per  lowest 
quintile 
American  Human 
Development Project  Eurostat on-line 
2001-2003  in  the 
US and 2001 or the 
nearest in Europe 
Election turnout: Voter turnout in 
presidential elections in the US and 
parliamentary elections in Europe 
%  of  voting-age 
population 
U.S.  Census  Bureau; 
The  Statistical 
Abstract:  2010 
edition 
Eurostat on-line  2000 or the nearest 
Homicide: The number of homicides; i.e. 
murder and nonnegligent manslaughter 
Per  million 
adults 
Uniform  Crime 
Reporting Statistics  Eurostat on-line  2000 
Unemployment: Unemployment rate given by 
the number of unemployed in the labour force  % of labor force 
BEA,  Geographic 
Profile  of 
Employment  and 
Unemployment 
Eurostat on-line  2000 
Labour force participation: The ratio of the 
labour force to the working age population, 
where the labour force is the sum of the 
numbers of persons employed and 
unemployed. 
% of labor force 
in  working-age 
population 
BEA,  Geographic 
Profile  of 
Employment  and 
Unemployment 
Eurostat on-line  2000 
Migration: The net migration rate given by 
the change of population plus deaths minus  
births as the proportion of the initial 
population. 
% of population  U.S.  Census  Bureau, 
Population Estimates  Eurostat on-line  2000 
Population density: The number of people 
per surface area  People per km
2  OECD.Stat  Regional 
Statistics  Eurostat on-line  2000 
Population: The number of inhabitants  People  OECD.Stat  Regional 
Statistics  Eurostat on-line  2000 
K-index: The deviation from an average 
pattern of specialization of the geographical 
entities included in the sample based on GDP 
data in 25 sectors. 
Index 
BEA,  Gross 
Domestic Product by 
Stat 
Eurostat on-line  2000 42 
 
Appendix A2. Correlation of Homicides (per million adults) with cross-country indicators from other sources 
 




Governance  Index  Fagerberg and 
Srholec (2008)  33  -0.49 
Political System  -0.58 
Voice and Accountability 
Index  Kaufmann, et al. 
(2009)  39 
-0.52 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism  -0.51 
Government Effectiveness  -0.52 
Regulatory Quality  -0.40 
Rule of Law  -0.56 
Control of Corruption  -0.53 
Agreement with  the  statement that  generally speaking most people  can be 
trusted  % 
World Value 
Survey 1999-
2000 or the 
nearest 
34  -0.39 
Affirmative answer on belonging to a voluntary organizations  %  29  -0.60 
Affirmative answer on doing unpaid work for a voluntary organizations  %  29  -0.51 
Affirmative answer on ever signing a petition  %  38  -0.50 
Affirmative answer on ever attending a lawful demonstration  %  38  -0.38 
Satisfaction with the way democracy is developing in the country on a 4-point 
scale from not at all to very much  4-point scale  34  -0.62 
Confidence in the parliament on a 4-point scale from none at all to a great deal  4-point scale  38  -0.46 
Confidence in the justice system on a 4-point scale from none at all to a great 
deal   4-point scale  33  -0.45 
A  view  on  how  well  things  are  going  with  the  system  for  governing  the 
country on a 10-point scale from bad to good  10-point scale  34  -0.62 
Preparation to actually do something to improve the conditions of people in 
the same neighborhood/community on a 5-point scale from absolutely no to 
absolutely yes 
5-point scale  28  -0.70 
 
Note: Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Iceland, Japan, Malta, New Zealand as well as the current EU candidate countries, namely Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey, have been 
added to boost robustness of the comparison. All indicators, except of the indexes derived from Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) and Kaufmann, et al. (2009), are used in logs.  